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7 Transnational Organised Crime
in Europe and North America:
Towards a Framework for
Prevention1,2
Adam Bouloukos, Graham Farrell and Gloria Laycock
7.1 Introduction
Previous volumes of the HEUNI regional reports have paid little or no attention
to transnational organized crime.3 Although the literature on transnational orga-
nized crime (hereafter TOC) is expanding rapidly, there remain few standardized
measures of the problem. There is even less of a formal framework for thinking
about how to prevent TOC in its various forms. The present chapter begins to ad-
dress these issues, with an emphasis upon practical aspects of the latter.
In the following section, TOC is defined and set in a global context, a broad
overview of factors relating to recent changes is given, and international legisla-
tive responses are described. This is followed by the presentation of a framework
that is frequently used in discussions of more general crime prevention efforts. It
is proposed that its utilization in this context will help inform the analysis of ef-
forts to prevent TOC.
7.2 Globalisation produces criminal opportunities
The term globalisation is simultaneously praised and criticized for many positive
and negative aspects of recent world developments. This reflects the observation
that the world appears to be engaged in a complicated restructuring of its under-
standing of classical national security. Historically, the terms defence and arms
control, as well as the use of force, were primarily referred to in relation to the
sovereign state. Several related factors are believed to have combined to produce
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1 The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the organizations with which they are affiliated.
2 Limiting a discussion of transnational organized crime to a sizable regional designation such as “Europe and North
America” is a bit difficult. Therefore, while this chapter makes reference to regional concerns, it should also be under-
stood that the scoop of criminal activities that emanate or exist in Europe and North America are not limited to but often
extend beyond the region.
3 While the HEUNI regional reports have paid little or no attention to this subject, HEUNI published Adamoli, et al (1998)
which formed part of the discussions below on matters of definitions, trends, and responses. Definitions and responses
were also addressed by Bouloukos and Farrell (1997). See also Winer (1998) for a discussion of trends and responses.
situations conducive to the increase in transnational organized crime: significant
political change (the end of the cold war being the most prominent) has increased
international movement of people and trade, the increasing global economy and
free-market movement of goods, combined with rapid technological change in-
cluding improvements in communications and transportation. It is also some-
times difficult to distinguish factors in western industrialised countries from
those in developing countries, since transnational organised crime can involve
movements between the two in both directions. These significant and wide-
spread changes appear, despite the lack of reliable quantifiable indicators, to
have manufactured a tipping point that has triggered widespread increases in
transnational organized crime. In short, one negative result of globalisation has
been a significant increase in the number of criminal opportunities open to ex-
ploitation by transnational organized criminals. Box 1 shows the types of factors
involved, grouped into two broad categories. The first is of technological change.
The second is socio-economic and political change. The box also includes a brief
description of how each aspect facilitates organized crime and transnational or-
ganized crime.
Box 1: Globalisation Factors producing Opportunities for Transnational
Organised Crime
A. Technological Change
• Cheaper and faster transportation. Effect: Facilitator to trafficking of
illicit products.
• Postal system distribution improvements. Effect: Facilitator to
trafficking.
• Improved computer and electronic communication technologies.
Effect: Facilitates large and rapid cash transactions in layering stages of
money laundering. Facilitates covert communications between and
within criminal groups.
B. Socio-economic and political change
• General trade liberalisation, particularly in developing countries.
Effect: Increased trade provides cover and markets for trafficking illicit
products.
• Increases shipping and aviation (trade and tourism).
• Trade agreements (EC, NAFTA). Effect: Increased flow of licit trade
and reduced border checks both reduce risk of trafficking illicit goods.
• Political integration (Eastern Europe and CIS; South Africa). Effect:
Increased trade to new markets gives increased cover and markets to
traffickers.
• Increased migration. Effect: Family networks, ties and cover for
trafficking and distribution networks.
• Increased global communications and financial transactions. Effect:
Provides opportunity and cover for international money laundering.
Source: Adapted from Keh and Farrell, 1997, p. 91
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The listing of factors that provide opportunities for TOC has one principal ad-
vantage. It implies that, since criminal opportunities can create TOC, then reduc-
ing criminal opportunities can be utilized to prevent TOC. The two sides of the
opportunity coin are necessarily related, and, as suggested below, the aim of
crime policy should be to minimise new opportunities and to eliminate existing
opportunities. The crime prevention framework presented later in this chapter is
intended to encourage the stifling and closing of criminal opportunities.
7.3 Definitions
The recent formal definitions of organized crime and transnational organized
crime outlined below have been based upon a platform of related research. “The
concept of ‘transnational crime’is exactly a quarter century old. The then United
Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch coined the term in order
to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders,
transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on another country”
(Mueller, 2001, p. 13). In a supplemental survey to the Fourth United Nations
Survey of Crime Trends and Criminal Justice Operations, transnational crime
was defined in the following manner: “Offences whose inception, prevention
and/or direct or indirect effects involved more than one country”. (United Na-
tions, 1995, para 9.)
In 1976, Michael Maltz identified six means by which organized crimes are
executed: violence, theft, corruption, economic coercion, deception, and victim
participation. Kenney and Finckenauer (1995) provide a definition of organized
crime that combines “actors” (those participating in organized criminal and
crime groups) with “acts” (the means of organized crime). For them, organized
crime groups: are non-ideological; have an organized hierarchy; have continuity
over time; use force or threat of force; restrict membership; obtain profit through
illegal enterprises; provide illegal goods and services desired by the general pop-
ulace; use corruption to neutralize public officials and politicians; seek a monop-
oly position to obtain exclusive control over specific goods and services; have
job specialization within the group; have a code of secrecy; and plan extensively
to achieve long-term goals.
Crime is often considered organized if the actors are involved on a sustained
basis, that is, if the activity is one of continuing criminal enterprise. In order to
meet this criteria, organized crime groups often incorporate strategies similar to
those employed in licit markets, including entrepreneurial skill, specialization,
and coordination with the additional components of violence and corruption that
allow for the propagation of illicit activities. Phil Williams draws many parallels
between TOC and the operations of legitimate industry (Williams,1992) and
suggests that they form strategic alliances (Williams, 1994). It may be, however,
that because transnational organised criminals so clearly pursue profits, and take
explicit account of the costs and benefits of exploiting criminal opportunities,
they are vulnerable. This feature of TOC makes it an attractive prospect for pre-
ventive measures that seek to reduce opportunities, impose additional costs, and
reduce the rewards of crime, as discussed later in this report.
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In the context of a debate about whether a set definition of transnational orga-
nized crime is either possible or desirable, the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime outlined some useful characteristics of
TOC without imposing the strict constraints of a tight definition.4 Article 2 of
The Convention deals with use of terms and defines organized criminal group,
serious crime, and structured groups as shown in Box 2.
Box 2: Definitions outlined in the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime
Article 2 states that
“Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or
more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the
aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in
accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a
financial or other material benefit;
“Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable
by a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious
penalty; [and,]
“Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for
the immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have for-
mally defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a de-
veloped structure.
Article 3 notes that an offence is transnational in nature if
a) It is committed in more than one State;
b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation,
planning, direction or control takes place in another State;
c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group
that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another
State.
In a similar fashion, The European Union drafted a set of Characteristics of Or-
ganized Crime, containing the eleven components shown in Box 3:5
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4 The Convention was adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 at the fifty-fifth session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with its article 36, the Convention was open for signature by all States
and by regional economic integration organizations, provided at least one Member State of such organization has
signed the Convention, from 12 to 15 December 2000 at the Palazzi di Giustizia in Palermo, Italy, and thereafter at the
United Nations Headquarters in New York until 12 December 2002.
5 EU/12247/1/94 Rev.1, Annex.
Box 3: Eleven Components of Organized Crime as defined by
the European Union
At least six of these components must be present, three of which must be
those numbered 1, 5 and 11, for any crime or criminal group to be classified
as organized:
1. Collaboration of more than 2 people;
2. Each with own appointed tasks;
3. For a prolonged or indefinite period of time;
4. Using some form of discipline and control;
5. Suspected of the commission of serious criminal offences;
6. Operating on an international level;
7. Using violence or other means suitable for intimidation;
8. Using commercial or businesslike structure;
9. Engaged in money laundering;
10. Exerting influence on politics, the media, public administration,
judicial authorities or the economy;
11. Determined by the pursuit of profit and/or power.
The United Nations International Centre for Crime Prevention has recently
emphasised the notion of dangerousness, that is, the threat that organized crime
poses to persons, institutions, and licit markets, and these elements are outlined
in Box 4. By defining the elements of dangerousness it was intended that govern-
ments would be able to increase the focus of their preventive efforts.
Box 4: Elements of ‘Dangerousness’ of Organized Crime as outlined by
the United Nations International Centre for Crime Prevention
– transnational organized crime groups engage in crimes which are
mala in se, wrong in themselves;
– in economic terms, the groups bring about material loss to victims;
– in psychological terms, the groups foster intimidation, coercion
and fear;
– in a social sense, the groups generate mistrust in institutions;
– an ability to challenge political and institutional authority;
– an ability to invest illicit proceeds into the licit economy;
– the investment in proceeds abroad thus removing resources
from the domestic economy. (United Nations, 2000a, p. 5-7)
This discussion suggests that there is no generally agreed definition of transna-
tional organized crime. However, while a definition of TOC may be necessary
for some legal purposes (if, for example, persons involved in TOC are to be
treated differently by the legal system), a definition that suffices may be suffi-
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cient from the viewpoint of crime prevention. In part this is because the key focus
of crime prevention efforts is largely upon the individual types of crime that are
committed, and the closing of crime-specific opportunities.
7.4 Data collection efforts
The normal practice of the United Nations crime prevention and criminal justice
programme, of which HEUNI is an affiliated member, is to base analyses of
global and regional crime on the periodic Surveys of Crime Trends and Criminal
Justice Operations or on the International Crime Victim Survey. While some of
the data gathered through these methods might be construed as proxies for orga-
nized crime they do not systematically collect information which directly mea-
sures levels of TOC. It is possible that the UNCJS survey could provide some in-
direct indicators of transnational organized crime via its measures related to drug
offences, bribery, fraud and embezzlement. Although many such offences are
not necessarily linked to organized or transnational crime, it is possible that
changes in them over time may reflect underlying increases relating to organized
crime. Some of these have recently been exploited: Van Horne and Farrell (1999)
examined drug offenders in the global criminal justice system and found that
their numbers had almost universally increased at the same time as it was known
that there had been significant increases in the global drug trade. Such figures
provide imperfect and indirect supporting measures of the spread of organized
crime.
Future sweeps of the UNCJS survey however, may benefit from efforts to cap-
ture data on organized crime. Member states could be encouraged, as suggested
by the UN Convention, to include transnational organized crime in their legisla-
tion and to record offenses that fit that category. The Survey could ask Member
States to estimate the proportion of drug offences, bribery, fraud and embezzle-
ment (and other crimes) that were committed by organized crime groups, and to
provide specific counts relating to organized crime. In addition, the Centre for
International Crime Prevention has considered preparing thematic supplemental
surveys that would be linked to the UNCJS survey proper. Such a supplemental
survey on transnational crime was conducted in 1994 as part of the Fourth Survey
and could surely be modified and repeated in the future. Apart from these more
traditional data collection methods of survey, the Centre has also begun to pre-
pare, with the assistance of national experts, criminal economy profiles. The in-
tent is to better understand the phases through which an illicit or licit product
moves through the economy with the assistance of criminal actors.
Elsewhere, pioneering efforts such as those by Phil Williams (1999) have
been made to gather pieces of the picture relating to various specific types of
transnational organized crime. Such efforts should be similarly encouraged – the
old adage that, with a little ingenuity, much knowledge can often be gained from
imperfect partial data – seems to be the case (or more likely the necessity) in this
instance. Williams typically builds a picture by putting together many small data
items from different sources. Often the whole is greater than the sum of the parts
and it is possible to derive larger-scale inferences from the resultant collage.
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It is exactly this collage technique that forms the basis of this HEUNI volume
and the preceding volume. As transnational organized crime is multidimen-
sional, the authors are certain that HEUNI is pointing in the right direction with
regard to the manner in which it purports to describe and explain crime in Europe
and North America.
7.5 Significant developments in transnational
organized crime trends
While some of the components of globalisation that have affected transnational
criminal opportunities were given brief mention above (see Box 1 and related
discussion), this section outlines some of the specific resultant trends. It gives an
overview of some of the factors related to and broad developments in transna-
tional organized crime in Europe and North America.
Perhaps the most significant individual socio-political event of recent de-
cades that has created new opportunities for transnational organized crime has
been the advent of Perestroika, the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union,
and the resultant market-oriented economies. These changes created new oppor-
tunities for organized crime in the region, concurrent with new government insti-
tutions that were ill equipped to address the growing problem. The result was that
“[a]t the end of the 1990’s, official sources reported that Russian organized
crime was composed of around 70,000 members and controlled an estimated
50 percent of the economy, including one third of the country’s 1,800 banks,
1,500 state-owned companies and 4,000 companies quoted on the stock ex-
change. There were an estimated 110 transnational criminal groups based in
Russia, which operated in 40 countries.” (United Nations, 2000b, p. 27)
Organized crime groups infiltrated both public and private institutions and in-
dustries, and, as a result, legitimized themselves so that the line between licit and
illicit rapidly became blurred. Organized crime groups have become major em-
ployers by replacing the formerly state run labor markets and trade unions
(Voronin, 1996). High levels of corruption in public government and private in-
dustry have reduced public trust and the willingness of foreign firms and agen-
cies to invest in the region. The instability of the financial sector has resulted in
massive capital flight, estimated to be about $1 billion per month, which is likely
to include laundered funds from criminal activity (United States, 2000).
The scope of organized crime activities and groups emanating from the for-
mer Soviet Union is difficult to assess. It is broadly accepted that Russian orga-
nized crime groups are active in its neighboring countries including Estonia, Lat-
via, Lithuania, Belarus, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Georgia, and the
Ukraine, and that its reaches extend into much of Europe as well as North Amer-
ica. The United States Government suggests that
“Russian criminal organizations in the United States are adept at moving
funds through a global complex of front companies, offshore financial service
182
centers, and crime-controlled banks to facilitate extraction of criminal pro-
ceeds originating in Russia, as well as to launder funds generated from
US-based criminal operations.” (op.cit., ch.3:17)
It is claimed that Russian groups are fully familiar with modern technologies and
business practices, and make use of documentation fraud, health care fraud, and
credit defaults all of which makes their criminal activities complex and difficult
to detect. (op.cit.).
In contrast to Eastern Europe, Western Europe and North America have expe-
rienced a period of economic stability and unity unprecedented in their history.
“The single market reforms of the European Union (EU) under the Schengen
Agreement that permitted unfettered movement of goods, services, labor, and
capital throughout most of Western Europe; sophisticated infrastructure for
facilitating international trade; and tremendous volume of people and goods
passing through commercial airports and seaports are exploited by interna-
tional criminals to move drugs, arms, illegal aliens, and other contraband
throughout Western Europe and to use EU gateways to reach every other re-
gion in the world.” (op.cit., ch.3:2)
Flows of licit and illicit goods and services, both east to west and west to east, are
exacerbated by the proximity of regions experiencing divergent economic, so-
cial and political realities. The situation is further enhanced by “middleman”
States such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic each possessing a suffi-
ciently complex and near-Western infrastructure of roads, railways, and tele-
communications but lacking the law enforcement and institutional mechanisms
to guard against infringements of these institutions. We should note here that we
are not characterizing the West as victims of crime exported from the East, but
rather that the rapid socio-economic transformation of the east has sped the
growth of criminal opportunities (as in the West but arguably from a more devel-
oped base) so that it has outpaced the growth of legislation and prevention ef-
forts.
7.6 Responses
The United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (2000)
makes use of legal mechanisms intended to “promote cooperation to prevent and
combat transnational crime more effectively” (Article 1). It attempts, among
other things, to promote rules and practices that encourage States to define, de-
sign and enforce instruments for law-enforcement and prosecutorial agencies,
and thus to encourage legislative consistency across jurisdictions. Such consis-
tency should minimise the loopholes that organized crime can exploit. Part of the
Convention (Article 31) encourages the development, evaluation and sharing of
best practices; the reduction of the possibility of illicitly obtained monies from
entering the licit economy; the reintegration into society of persons convicted of
organized crimes; the periodic evaluation of legislation and administrative regu-
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lations; the promotion of public awareness campaigns; and, the sharing of agen-
cies and authorities that might assist other States.
The Convention encourages a number of approaches to the prevention of
TOC. Specifically, it encourages ‘rule setting’ that blocks the criminal opportu-
nities available to organised crime (Clarke and Homel, 1997). This approach is
one of many in the preventive repertoire. Efforts to develop preventive ap-
proaches to TOC would benefit from greater conceptual clarification of the kind
that is common in the discussion of crime prevention more generally. There are a
number of options for classifying crime prevention (e.g. Lab, 1999; Lavrakas
and Bennett, 1988; Van Dijk and De Waard, 1991). In what follows,
Brantingham and Faust’s (1976) classification of primary, secondary or tertiary
is utilised. Primary crime prevention, rather like preventive medicine, is in-
tended to stop the crime before it happens. Secondary prevention is directed at
those at heightened risk of offending. Tertiary prevention deals with known of-
fenders – in effect it operates through the criminal justice system. Much of the
discussion of ‘prevention’ in the existing literature relating to TOC conflates
these approaches to prevention.
For the reasons given below, the discussion that follows focuses upon primary
prevention. Primary prevention “identifies conditions in the physical and social
environment that provide opportunities for or precipitate criminal acts”. Primary
prevention can be divided into social and situational components. Social preven-
tion addresses the inclination to offend; it might include education programs, job
training, or the alleviation of poverty. Such schemes would be available to all cit-
izens – potential offenders or not.
Although clearly social crime prevention has a role to play in the prevention of
crime generally, its potential is limited and it is inefficient as a means of prevent-
ing transnational organised crime. The crime prevention ‘pay-off’ from such so-
cial interventions is longer term. It is not until the children grow that the benefits
of education as a crime prevention measure, for example, come into their own.
Arguably, something more immediate is required in tackling transnational or-
ganised crime. Furthermore, although there are many excellent reasons for try-
ing to improve education levels, provide job training schemes, and reduce pov-
erty, the prevention of transnational organised crime would not be among the key
contenders. Citizens have the right of access to education and employment op-
portunities for their own sake, not simply as a crime prevention measure.
Not only is the potential preventive effect of social measures long term, but
their relevance may be questionable in relation to transnational organised crime.
There is no evidence that all members of organised crime syndicates are socially
marginalised. Indeed, in the former Soviet Union some of the major members of
organised gangs, rather like the Italian Mafia, are wealthy and well-educated in-
dividuals. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the members of organised
crime groups come from any particular locality. They could be drawn from a very
wide region, and attempting to improve education levels or provide school-based
or other social programs as a means of preventing transnational organised crime,
would require investment over a potentially vast area. It is difficult to see how it
could be targeted on high-risk individuals and therefore difficult to see how it
could be cost effective. Finally there is no shortage of transnational organised
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criminals operating in advanced democracies where education levels and legiti-
mate job opportunities are relatively common. To somehow suggest, as some
commentators have, that an education program in Colombia might reduce the in-
cidence of corruption and transnational drug trafficking, when it has had limited
success in the United States, does not seem a rational or efficient use of limited
resources.
Situational crime prevention, on the other hand, offers more immediate
pay-off as a preventive approach and is as effective in preventing crime by rich
and poor, disorganised and organised. It has been defined by Clarke (1983) as
comprising measures:
1 that are directed at highly specific forms of crime
2 that involve the management, design, or manipulation of the immediate
environment in as systematic and permanent a way as possible
3 that reduce the opportunities for crime and increase the risks as perceived
by a wide range of offenders.
This approach to prevention addresses features of the environment in which
crimes occur, or aspects of the target against which crimes occur. It analyses,
with some precision, the context within which criminal events happen and then
reduces the opportunity for their recurrence. It is closely affiliated with the prob-
lem-oriented approach to policing (see Goldstein 1990) that is too rarely dis-
cussed in the context of TOC.
The remainder of this section considers the potential of situational crime pre-
vention when applied to transnational organised crime. It argues that, from one
perspective, it already operates as an approach to the prevention of transnational
organised crime, and has already demonstrated its efficacy. In addition, and most
importantly, however, it proposes that it might be more effective if applied more
formally and systematically, taking lessons from situational applications in other
crime control contexts.
There are numerous examples of changes in the ‘situation’ resulting in reduc-
tions in crime. Clarke (1992) produced a useful classification of these situational
techniques which illuminates the underlying principles through which they op-
erate. This classification was later elaborated upon by Clarke and Homel (1997),
resulting in a sixteen-cell framework laying out the techniques of situational
crime prevention and providing examples from the research literature. The
framework is set out below in Box 5, including examples that are routinely (or
specially) used to prevent organised crime.
The list of preventive techniques and the examples given in Box 5 will not be
explained in full. The interested reader is referred to Clarke (1998) for the most
up-to-date explanation of these preventive techniques. It is, however, worth ex-
plaining the framework and some of the examples in order to demonstrate their
general utility and the manner in which they should assist the international com-
munity in developing a portfolio of prevention efforts to tackle TOC.
The framework divides into four broad categories of preventive effort: in-
creasing the effort, increasing the risks, reducing the rewards, and removing the
excuses. These categories fit the analysis of organized crime as being based
upon, broadly speaking, rational decision-making of criminal actors that incor-
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Technique (and brief definition) ‘Traditional’ crime prevention Preventing organized crime
A. Increasing the Effort
1. Target hardening: making the
commission of a crime more
difficult.
Slug rejecter devices
Steering locks
Bandit screens
Tower of London
(Crown Jewels)
Fort Knox (Gold)
Car anti-theft devices stop
organized car theft
2. Controlling access to targets:
limiting access of would-be
perpetrators to the place where
crime is possible.
Parking lot barriers
Fenced yards
Entry phones
Password protection
Security at art galleries
Border checkpoints
Crop-dusting plane registers
3. Deflecting offenders and victims:
inducing offenders or victims to be
elsewhere than at a place where
crime is possible.
Bus stop placement
Tavern location
Street closures
Decoy Vehicles
Decoy shipments
Ships travelling in convoy
4. Controlling crime facilitators:
Controlling the means whereby
crime is made possible or easier.
Credit card photo
Gun controls
Caller-ID
Controlling precursors
chemicals used in the
production of drugs
B. Increasing the risks
5. Screening entrances and exits:
increasing conspicuousness when
rules are not being observed.
Automatic ticket gates
Baggage screening
Merchandise tags
Passport and Visa controls
Import and Export Documents
Biometric scans
6. Formal surveillance (of victims
and offenders): locating perpetrators,
victims or crime-prone places in time
and space.
Red light cameras
Burglar alarms
Security guards
X-ray machines
Custom’s checks
Satellite surveillance
7. Surveillance by employees:
the oversight by those at work as
part of their work function.
Pay phone locations
Parking attendants
CCTV systems
Support for whistle-blower
policies in employee
regulations
8. Natural surveillance: making crime
or the identity of those committing
crime more visible.
Defensible space
Street lighting
Cab driver ID
Journalistic reports on mafia
bosses
Ten Most Wanted list
C. Reducing the rewards
9. Removing targets: making a crime
impossible because its purpose is
precluded or its object unavailable.
Removable car radio
Women’s refuges
Phonecard
Eliminating high value bank
notes stops their forgery
10. Identifying property: making
stolen goods more easily
recognisable.
Property marking
Vehicle licensing
Cattle branding
Unique dot-marking of art and
valuables
Intellectual property registers
Box 5: Prevention Techniques for Organized Crime (and ‘traditional’ crime)
porates an assessment of the costs and benefits involved. Transnational orga-
nized crime occurs because those involved perceive the likely benefits to out-
weigh the likely costs. The overarching aim of the situational approach there-
fore, is to tip the scales of this analysis by increasing the costs and/or reducing the
rewards to transnational organized crime.
Although the column of cells addressing measures to tackle organized crime
focuses upon crimes that are ‘traditionally’ thought of as organized, it is of note
that many measures directed at ‘ordinary’ crimes can have an effect on some
forms of organised crime. Street lighting could impact upon criminal opportuni-
ties for organized car crime, as could legislation that made car immobilizers
compulsory. Alarms, sensor systems and closed-circuit television on business
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Technique (and brief definition) ‘Traditional’ crime prevention Preventing organized crime
11. Reducing temptation: limiting
occasions on which a potential target
is publicly identifiable as such.
Gender-neutral phone lists
Off-street parking
Rapid repair
Decoy shipments (money;
prisoners etc.)
GPS tracking of goods
12. Denying benefits: design or later
action make the crime less profitable
after the fact.
Ink merchandise tags
PIN for car radios
Graffiti cleaning
Exploding dye on bank money
Asset seizure legislation
D. Removing Excuses
13. Setting rules: clearly defining
the law and unacceptable conduct
(and the consequences).
Harassment codes
Customs declaration
Hotel registrations
Cash deposits limits to stop
money laundering
No-negotiation anti-hijacking
policy
14. Alerting conscience: publicising
the rules (subtly or otherwise) to
make offenders think twice.
‘Walking tall’
Roadside speedometers
‘Shoplifting is stealing’
‘Idiots drink and drive’
Goods to declare channel at
customs
“Drug production by-products
damage the environment”
message
15. Controlling disinhibitors: reducing
the frequency of states that may
induce rule breaking.
Drinking age laws
Ignition interlock
V-chip
Control of precursors of drugs
Clear definitions of corruption
Sealed cargo containers
16. Assisting compliance: making it
easy to follow the rules or law.
Easy library checkout
Public lavatories
Trash bins
Regular monitoring of arms
manufacturers
Assistance in destroying
biological weapons
International decommissioning
bodies (eg. Monitoring arms
decommissioning)
Bomb-proof trash bins
Box 5: (continued)
premises may reduce thefts of goods that would result in transnational shipments
prior to sale. Sealed cargo containers can eliminate an avenue for illicit transna-
tional shipments if illicit goods cannot be added to a container that is shipped un-
der the auspices of a reputable licit trader. Such measures may have positive
domino effects – for example, if the removal of the shipment opportunity meant
that there was no point (that is, reward to) obtaining the illicit goods for ship-
ment.
The boundary between organized crime and transnational organized crime is
somewhat blurred in the final column of Box 5. It is proposed that the prevention
of many types of organized crime, in addition to those of a transnational nature,
will benefit from the more widespread formal development of situational crime
prevention interventions. Many types of crime that were previously just labelled
‘organized’are increasingly being labelled ‘transnational’because the process of
globalization has created the potential for interaction between new markets. Or-
ganized car theft and shipment is one example of such a crime. It is also an exam-
ple of a type of crime where modifications to the potential target (design changes
to cars) are likely to be a fruitful avenue for prevention since law enforcement ef-
forts aimed simply at organizations leave the same criminal opportunities to be
adopted by others. The highly dynamic illicit drug trade has demonstrated this
kind of adaptation on several occasions when the collapse of one large criminal
organization has left it to be replaced by one or more others.
Some efforts to prevent TOC are so common that they appear second-nature
and are not recognized as crime prevention efforts. Passports are one of the most
straightforward examples of everyday efforts to tackle TOC. By providing a
means of controlling access to and from countries, they discourage and make it
more difficult and risky to cross international borders illegally, and reduce the
level of the illicit movement (trafficking) of humans. Although the smuggling of
humans across borders still occurs, it is far less prevalent than it would be in the
absence of passports and border checks. Passports have become such an every-
day part of many people’s lives that their formal crime prevention role, and the
mechanism by which they work to prevent transnational crime, can be easily
overlooked. As the manufacture of passports has become more sophisticated, the
costs of forging passports, and the skills required, have increased significantly.
This increases the costs to organized crime and will have eliminated most illegal
border crossings that would occur in the absence of passports and border checks.
Those organized border crossings that remain are in vastly reduced numbers and
are far more risky and costly to organized criminals than they would otherwise
be. Hence, although we would be hard pressed to provide the relevant empirical
evidence, it is reasonable to conclude that simple and accepted measures such as
passports can have significant effects upon the prevalence of TOC. The orga-
nized crime of counterfeiting of money has likewise become more difficult as
production technologies have improved, although even here an ‘arms race’ can
take place between criminals and crime preventers. Many relatively simple situ-
ational measures – for example, using paper that is difficult to obtain, incorporat-
ing watermarks, using complex designs that are difficult to replicate, have served
to make the counterfeiting of money extremely difficult and costly, as well as in-
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creasing the likelihood of detection. Still, new criminal opportunities arise. The
new European currency unit, the Euro, is alleged to have at least one coin that is
virtually indistinguishable from a lower value coin from another country. This
presents a new opportunity for TOC – the transnational shipments of such coins
and their substitution for the higher value coins will prove a profitable continuing
enterprise unless efforts are made to remove the opportunity. Possible interven-
tions could include coin re-design, publicity to alert potential victims, re-valuing
or withdrawing one of the coins, or improved techniques for the identification
and marking of one of the coins.
The monitoring of the level of cash that can be deposited in financial institu-
tions in single over-the-counter transactions is another simple situational mea-
sure used to tackle money laundering. Many criminal transactions utilise cash
since it is seldom traceable, but the result can be that higher-level criminals are
left with large sums of money to deposit and launder. Without receipts and in-
voices (a paper trail that can be traced) there is little alternative to depositing this
money in banks in large amounts. However, since this is not an everyday occur-
rence for most people, imposing a limit on cash deposits and introducing simple
monitoring procedures will primarily hinder organized crime without imposing
significant costs on legal transactions. Legal depositors can complete the rele-
vant paperwork with impunity, whereas illegal depositors are unlikely to do so.
The result in some instances has been a tactical displacement to ‘smurfing’ –
multiple small deposits by different individuals working for the same criminal
network. However, smurfing incurs far more effort and risk for organized crime:
it means that many more low-level criminals have to be both paid, and entrusted
with lumps of money. These workers may, if detected, be more likely to give up
any intelligence information they may have. When combined with additional sit-
uational measures such as tracing the paper-trail of suspect monies, the gradual
closing of legal loopholes that exist in certain countries (such as off-shore havens
with limited legal requirements for financial transactions), and other situational
measures such as asset seizure (which remove the rewards to organized crime),
organized criminals are constantly being squeezed, making such crime a less at-
tractive prospect.
Despite claims that money laundering is still relatively easy, it does not seem
unreasonable to expect that continued efforts to close the loopholes and to trace
illegal money via various methods, will prove a long-term success in the fight
against many types of organized crime. While such situational prevention efforts
are specific to the crime of money laundering, they also impact upon a range of
related organized crime that provides the money to be laundered. In general, such
efforts also increase the skill-level that is required of organised criminals, pro-
ducing an effective ‘barrier to entry’ to criminals who do not have these skills. In
this way, situational prevention may in the longer term also reduce the propensity
to turn to organised crime among the pool of potential offenders.
Problem-oriented policing and crime analysis techniques that allow the iden-
tification of patterns and trends in crime and its characteristics, have all proved
useful in tackling many types of non-organised crime. These approaches should
be encouraged in relation to the prevention of organised crime and are a comple-
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ment to situational prevention efforts. While the international community has
begun to foster some movement towards the dissemination of such techniques in
relation to ‘traditional’ non-organized crime, there appears to be a need for such
work to be promoted in relation to TOC.
7.7 Conclusions
The conclusions to this chapter take two forms. The present chapter has focused
primarily upon a theoretical rather than an empirical contribution to the preven-
tion of transnational organized crime in Europe and North America. It is pro-
posed that the accumulation of knowledge must be incremental and that efforts
in the future might benefit from drawing together the empirical data sources on
specific types of transnational organized crime. This includes analysis of those
aspects of the UNCJS survey that might fruitfully provide some indirect indica-
tors relating to organized crime – measures relating to drug offences, bribery,
fraud and embezzlement. Their combination with other indicators such as the
Corruptions Perception Index developed by Transparency International may
shed empirical light upon general trends and patterns in these crimes. It is also
hoped that future sweeps of the UNCJS survey might incorporate more direct
measures of organized crime. This knowledge will prove of more practical utility
if it can be combined within a preventive framework and if it is supported by lo-
cal and crime-specific analyses. Increased knowledge and understanding of
TOC is, after all, only useful and worthwhile if it is used to inform preventive ef-
forts in some fashion.
The emphasis of a significant part of this chapter has been upon developing a
framework around which practical efforts to prevent organized crime might be
developed. This seems appropriate given the stage which we have now reached
in relation to the study and prevention of transnational organised crime. There
have been many recent efforts to describe the nature and extent of organized
crime. These are certainly important and should continue, with increasing em-
phasis upon the details of the crime and context-specific analysis. To date, how-
ever, there has been little effort expended upon the study and evaluation of practi-
cal preventive efforts. There is, therefore, a great need for the delineation of a for-
mal prevention framework such as that proposed here. The transfer of a proven
and existing framework for these purposes provides a significant opportunity for
knowledge transfer. The approach is only new in the present context – hence
there are potential benefits of cross-fertilization to the field of transnational or-
ganised crime from the established situational crime prevention experience of
dealing with other offences. It is proposed that increasing the costs and reducing
the benefits to organised crime should prove a more productive and cost-effec-
tive approach to tackling the problem. It is likely that the most significant inroads
into organised crime will be made through the continued adoption of the tech-
niques of situational prevention. A formal framework such as that proposed here
provides a means by which such efforts can be promoted and encouraged.
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